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Abstract
Abstraction-carrying Code (ACC) certies a general temporal property for a mo-
bile program using an abstract interpretation of the mobile program. A client
receiving the code and the certicate will rst validate the abstraction and then run
a model checker to verify the temporal property.
In this paper, we report our experience in designing the ACC Evaluation Pro-
totype Toolkit (ACCEPT) and the application of ACCEPT to simple concurrent
programs and Linux device drivers. The toolkit is distinguished by an abstraction
preserving compilation scheme that generates a Boolean program for an intermedi-
ate program compiled from the source program. Some common compiler optimiza-
tions are still possible. We report several applications of ACCEPT, including the
reachability properties of industrial strength C programs. Preliminary results show
that the size of a typical certicate is signicantly smaller than the size of the in-
termediate program. Compared with traditional proof-based certication method,
using ACC verication a client spends more time to verify the desired property.
Our experience shows this penalty is often tolerable in practice.
1 Introduction
Proof-carrying code (PCC) techniques address the problem of how a client
trusts a mobile (typically low-level) program by verifying a mathematical proof
for certain safety properties [18]. Specically, a server applies a safety policy to
the program to generate verication conditions (VCs) and certies the safety
property with a checkable proof of the VCs. When a client generates the same
set of VCs and checks the proof, PCC guarantees a client the safety of that
program. Early variants of PCC, including TAL [17,16], ECC [13], Certied
Binary [22], FPCC [1], TouchStone [18] and others, focus primarily on the
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verication of type safety and memory safety, properties easily expressed in
rst-order logic.
More powerful safety policies, such as the correct use of APIs [2,9], or
liveness requirements, are expressible by temporal logic [14]. To enforce such
a policy we must be able to certify and verify temporal properties. Researchers
are extending the PCC framework to address temporal properties. In most
of the proposed systems a certicate is, as in PCC, a proof of the temporal
property. Whether this proof is worked out using a theorem prover, as in
the case of Temporal PCC (TPCC) [4], or translated from the computation
of a model checker [23,11,12], the size of the proof tends to be large due to
the state explosion phenomenon. Typically, the certicates generated in these
systems are as big as the search trees generated during model checking, which
are exponential in the size of the program in the worst case. This fact alone
hinders these systems from being deployed in a practical setting, especially
when the application have multiple properties of interest.
We have proposed Abstraction-carrying code (ACC) [24] where, instead of
using a proof, we adopt an abstract interpretation [6] of a mobile program as a
certicate for temporal properties. We have designed ACCEPT (ACC Evalua-
tion Prototype Toolkit). This toolkit adopts renement based [5,20] predicate
abstraction techniques [2,21,8,7,3] to compute a predicate abstraction of the
source program. The innovative part of the toolkit is: (1) we compile the
source code into an intermediate program, during which we also transform
a Boolean program [2] of the source to a Boolean program abstracting the
intermediate code; and (2) we encode the Boolean program (together with the
concrete predicates) as index type annotations in an intermediate program.
This type-annotated program (called SDTAL: Simplied Dependent Typed
Intermediate Language) is sent to a client. The client will rst type check
the program to validate the Boolean abstraction. From the type annotations
we can recover a Boolean program which, when model checked successfully,
will verify the temporal property. Fig. 1 illustrates the relationship between
major data artifacts in ACCEPT.
Although we expect model checking an abstraction to be quicker than
model checking the original program, if the latter is ever possible, verifying
the certicate through model checking is more expensive than verifying the
certicate through proof-checking. Therefore, our approach trades verication
time (by a client) for certicate size .
This paper explains the abstraction-preserving compilation scheme and
reports the application of ACC to two categories of problems. One is the
certication of well studied temporal safety and liveness properties of some
toy concurrent programs. The other is the reachability properties of realistic
C programs. The most distinctive advantage of our approach is that we are
able to reduce the size of the certicate. For example, using ACCEPT, we
often generate certicates ten per cent of the size of intermediate programs.
As mentioned earlier, this advantage in certicate size comes with a price: the
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x++;
inc  r0
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[x>0]=H([x>0],0)
Compilation
(...):(r0_r==r0+1)
predicate abstraction
index-type checking 
Source Program Boolean Program
Index TypesSDTAL instruction
Fig. 1. Relation between source program, intermediate program, Boolean program
and index type
time spent on verication will increase. Our experience demonstrates that for
some practical applications, this penalty is tolerable.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we use an example to
introduce the design rationale behind ACCEPT. Section 3 presents the ACC
infrastructure, where we represent programs as control ow automata (CFA).
Section 4 introduces the abstraction-preserving compilation scheme from a
source program to an intermediate one. This compilation is guided by CFAs.
Section 5 describes our experience of applying the infrastructure to certifying
liveness properties of small concurrent programs and reachability properties
of industrial strength programs. Section 6 concludes.
2 Motivating Example
Suppose we are going to send a piece of Java bytecode program to a client.
This piece of code implements two bounded buers. On the left side of Fig. 2
we list the source code (written in a Java like language) fragment of the
bounded buer program. There are two symmetric threads, the code listed
here showing one of them. Variables buf
1
and buf
2
count the elements in the
buers. The capacity of both buers is bound. The thread shown constantly
moves elements from one buer to the other. The other thread does the
opposite. One of the properties to expect is that whenever a buer is full,
sometime in the future one of the elements must be removed, if the system
has a fair scheduling policy. This property, which we name as FullToNonFull,
can be expressed in a Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) term as
2(Full! 3NonFull) (FullToNonFull).
Model checking this property on the source program directly is expensive
due to the state explosion. A popular way to attack this problem is predicate
abstraction[8,21,7,3,2]. A practical predicate abstraction method observes a
program's behavior on a selected set of predicates and translates the state-
ments of the program into statements that operate exclusively on Boolean
variables representing the predicates. The result is a Boolean program[2]. For
example, using the following predicates, the body of the run function in the
example is translated into the Boolean program to the right in Fig. 2, where we
use brackets to group simultaneous assignments. An H function returns true
(1) if the rst argument is true, false (0) if otherwise the second argument is
3
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// int buf1=bound, buf2=0;
// int bound= 50;
thread1 {
buf1 = bound;
run() {
while (true){
synchronized {
while (buf1 <= 0)
wait();
buf1--;};
synchronized {
while (buf2 >= bound)
wait();
buf2++;}
}
}
}
// thread2 symmetric to thread1
while 1
synchronized{
while (*) {assume(empty1);wait};
assume (! empty1);
[
full1 := H(0,full1 || nonfull1),
nonfull1 := H(full1 || nonfull1, 0),
empty1 := *;
]
}
while 1
synchronized{
while (*) { assume (full2); wait};
assume (! full2);
[
empty2 := H(0,empty2 || nonfull2),
nonfull2 := H(0, full2 ),
full2 := *;
]
}
Fig. 2. Bounded Buer Example and Its Predicate Abstraction (Some omissions
are made)
true, or non-deterministic (*) otherwise.
fEmpty
i
: buf
i
= 0;
Full
i
: buf
i
= bound;
NonFull
i
: buf
i
< boundg
where i = 0; 1:
.
If we send the Boolean program and the source to a client, the client can
verify the FullToNonFull property. However, a mobile program is often in a
binary form. A client will examine a temporal correctness property on the
intermediate level program. To simplify the problem, we assume that the
properties being observed on the intermediate level program are the same
properties being observed on the source program. This assumption implies
that there is a one-to-one correspondence between source variables and in-
termediate program variables mentioned in the temporal properties. We will
formalize this concept later. For now, when we talk about a variable, we will
not distinguish if it is a source variable or a symbolic name for a memory
location in the intermediate level program, which should be obvious from the
context. For example, we will use variable buf
1
for both the source variable
and the memory location used in the intermediate level program.
To certify a temporal property for an intermediate level program, our job is
thus to compute a Boolean program that abstracts the target program relative
to the temporal property.
Abstraction Usually, for a Boolean program to characterize the same
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computational eect, we need more predicates to abstract an intermediate
program than to abstract a source program. The reason is that with a source
program we abstract a source statement at a time, which hides some interme-
diate states introduced by the corresponding intermediate level program. As
an example, for an assignment x = 2  x+1 in C and a predicate fx > 0g, we
will have a Boolean assignment that states: if x > 0 beforehand, then it will
be so afterwards. A corresponding intermediate sequence, fmul x 2 r
0
; add r
0
1 xg will need another predicate fr
0
> 0g if we abstract one instruction at a
time. Consequently, abstracting intermediate code tends to generate a large
predicate set. On the other hand, abstraction methods that treat statements
in a source program as units of abstraction have been successful in practical
systems such as SLAM.
This discussion leads to the following method to prepare a Boolean pro-
gram for an intermediate program: Given a source program and its Boolean
abstraction, we extract the control ow diagram they share. We compile the
source program into an intermediate program that renes the same control
ow. An intermediate block compiled from a source statement is associated
with the corresponding Boolean program statement. We will ensure that an
intermediate block has the same eect on a set of observable variables as the
corresponding source statement does. Observable variables are the variables
whose values aect the evaluation of the temporal property. They dene the
state space for a (useful) Boolean program. Therefore, for the computation of
a Boolean program, all variables appeared in the predicate set are observable.
Two restrictions apply to make it suÆcient to argue that the intermediate
program has the same eect as the source program, as far as the observable
variables are concerned. First, we maintain the atomicity of memory access:
one block can have at most one store to observable variables
2
. Second, the
observable variables are made volatile, that is, a store is emitted as soon as
the variable is modied. For now, we treat variables involved in predicates as
observable variables as well. This treatment is technically unnecessary when
we can correctly handle register allocations, which is discussed later in this
paper.
For example, when we compile the bounded buer example, the body of
the innite loop corresponds to the control ow automaton (CFA) in Fig. 3,
which also shows a corresponding intermediate CFA. Both CFAs correspond
to the same Boolean program. It is also possible to optimize the intermediate
code. When we do so, we shall transform the Boolean program as well. As a
result, we have a Boolean program that not only abstracts the intermediate
program but also model checks the temporal property.
We can use the Boolean program as a certicate of the FullToNonFull
property of the intermediate program. In ACCEPT, we encode the Boolean
2
Here we assume a source statement modies at most one observable variable. Otherwise
the verication on the source program could be unsound.
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skip
buf1>0
buf1<=0
true
wait
buf1--
(a):Source Program
jmp next
next:
while
cmp buf1 0
jle wait
wait:
call wait
load r0 buf1
dec ro
store r0 buf1
jmp while
(b):Intermediate Program
Fig. 3. Snippet of Bounded Buer Example in CFA
program as type annotations of an index typed intermediate language. Details
of the encoding are presented elsewhere [25]. It suÆces to know that an
intermediate block corresponds to a rst-order logic formula over the variables
in the starting and nish state of the block. A branch target is associated
with a predicate, which represents a condition when the control reaches that
location.
The client will type check the type annotated intermediate representation.
Soundness of the index type system for the intermediate language guarantees
that only valid abstractions can be encoded as types. Thus, the type correct-
ness of the intermediate representation implies the soundness of the encoded
Boolean abstraction. After type checking, the Boolean program encoded by
the type annotations is restored. A positive result by a model checker on this
representation guarantees that certain properties of interest hold for the inter-
mediate representation. More specically, because an abstraction is an over
approximation of the mobile program, we can verify only global properties
such as those expressible in LTL.
3 Description of ACCEPT in CFAs
In this section, we formalize the ACC framework independent of the program-
ming language and the abstraction method. We describe the system under
investigation using control ow automata [10]. ACCEPT is an instance of the
framework where the abstraction method is Boolean abstraction. We show
that ACCEPT can certify next-operator free LTL formulas.
3.1 Control Flow Automaton
We use a control ow automaton (CFA) to model a program's control ow.
Intuitively, a CFA comprises: (1) variables, such as local and global variables in
a source program, or memory locations, including registers, in an intermediate
program, (2) vertices: control locations of a program, and (3) labeled directed
edges that connect vertices. An edge is labeled either with a sequence of
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instructions that are executed to move from the source to destination locations
of the edge, or with a predicate corresponding to the branch condition that
must be true for that edge to be taken, or with a symbol for surrendering the
CPU in a concurrent setting.
Formally, a CFA is a tuple (Q;Q
0
; X; Op;!), where Q is a nite set of
control locations, Q
0
is the set of initial control locations, X is a nite set of
variables, Op is a set of operations, and ! (Q  Op  Q) is a nite set of
edges labeled with operations. The operation allowed is one of the following:
(1) a sequence that consists of one or more instructions or statements, (2) a
predicate that enables the transition, or (3) a symbol i that indicates the CPU
may be surrendered to another thread (this case is only useful in languages
with a notion of interleaved concurrency).
A program written in C can be translated into a CFA [15]. Because a
Boolean program shares the same CFA as the original program, if we want
to associate the intermediate program with the same Boolean program, it is
essential to preserve the CFA structure when compiling the source program
into an intermediate program.
3.2 From CFA to Transition System
Let v
X
be valuations over X that contain type-preserving functions from X
to values. A state is a pair in Q  v
X
. A region is a set of states. Let R
range over regions. The location component q in a state (q; V
X
) can be viewed
as part of X (technically X may need to be expanded). Thus a state is an
element in v
X
. A transition system induced by a CFA (Q;Q
0
; X; Op;!) will
be a tuple (R; R
0
;!), where R here represents the set of all possible states,
R
0
is the set of the initial states, and ! is reused to represent the transition
relation dened by edges!. Note that we may refer to this transition relation
as the post operator. Accepting states are not dened in this system.
Standard techniques allow us to determine if this transition system satises
an LTL formula , provided that we can evaluate the atomic propositions
of  at a given state. We rst construct a Buchi automaton that accepts
the negation of . Then we construct a product automaton of the Buchi
automaton and the transition system. Model checking this automaton will
evaluate .
So far we have not distinguished a concrete program and an abstract pro-
gram. An abstract program is induced by an abstraction of the state space
X. The abstraction, as usual, is dened by a pair (; ) that forms a Galois
connection between all concrete states and all abstract states. The abstraction
function  will map a concrete region to an abstract one. The pair induces
an abstract transition relation !
a
between abstract regions. We thus can
compute an abstract transition system dened by an abstract state space and
!
a
. We can model check the abstract transition system to verify the property
on the concrete system. Because of the Galois connection requirement, the
7
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relation !
a
is an over approximation of !. As a result, if we model check
the abstract transition system, only global properties, such as LTL formulas,
can be veried on the original system.
ACCEPT adopts Boolean abstraction, where the abstract transition !
a
is dened by a Boolean program[2]. Usually, for a software system, most
abstractions will verify a next operator-free LTL formula.
4 Certifying Compiler
This section addresses the construction of a certicate on the server side.
While our intent is to be source language neutral, when specics are required
we will refer to our C language prototype. The goal of the certicate con-
struction is to reuse the Boolean program model of the source program as a
model of the intermediate representation sent to the client. This is achieved
by compiling the source code in such a way that the intermediate code de-
nes the same abstract !
a
operator as the source code. In other words, the
Boolean program, intact, is also a valid abstraction of the intermediate pro-
gram. Naturally this compilation restricts the types of optimizations that can
be applied. This restriction can be partially lifted by transforming the in-
termediate program and the Boolean programs in parallel. The new Boolean
program not only abstracts the optimized intermediate code, but also model
checks the temporal properties of concern.
4.1 Evaluation of Temporal Properties on Intermediate Programs
We assume the temporal property examined by a client on the mobile code
is literally the same as the temporal property the server side veries on the
source program. We map the variables in the source program into variables
(with the same names) in the intermediate language program. We will treat
a block of intermediate language code as an atomic operation used to label a
CFA transition. To help evaluate the temporal property correctly, an observ-
able variable is required to be volatile during compilation: we issue a store
operation to the memory location whenever its register copy is modied, be-
fore the block ends. This is for the eect on that variable to be observed the
instant the operation is performed. Note that for a model checker, the state
contains all observable variables. The volatility requirement is necessary for a
model checker to observe the change in the state.
To simplify presentation, the temporal property observed on the interme-
diate program is literally the same as the one observed on the source program.
In fact, as long as we keep track of the correspondence between source vari-
ables and their storage in the intermediate program, we can have a sound
compilation/abstraction scheme. For example, later we will introduce how we
handle register allocation, where we allow the eect to be observed on registers
that hold source variables.
8
Xia and Hook
We also assume a function comp that compiles a non-transition source
statement into intermediate instructions. We omit the storage allocation
which comp typically relies on.
4.2 Compilation
Our compilation takes a source program and a Boolean program and outputs
an intermediate language program with two kinds of annotations. One kind of
annotation is a system of simultaneous Boolean assignments associated with
a block. A block is a sequence of instructions. The other kind of annotation
is a predicate associated with a location. These annotations represent assume
statements in a Boolean program.
For each source function, we traverse all edges in its CFA representation.
If an edge is labeled by Boolean assignments, we will call comp to compile the
operations on these edges into a corresponding intermediate language instruc-
tion sequence; the resultant sequence forms a block annotated by the Boolean
assignments corresponding to the source statement. If an edge is a predicate,
we compile it together with its dual edge, the edge labeled with the negation
of this predicate. We rst call comp to compile an assignment that assigns
the predicate to a temporary variable; the result is an intermediate block that
evaluates the conditional; we do not associate any Boolean statement with this
block. Then we generate transition instructions; the target locations of the
transition instructions are annotated with the labeled predicates, respectively.
3
The result of this algorithm is an (unoptimized) intermediate program.
The control ow is preserved, so is the correspondence with the Boolean pro-
gram. The code presented in Fig. 3 is slightly adjusted for readability.
4.3 Abstraction Preservation
The intermediate code generated denes a ! relation isomorphic to that de-
ned by the source program. The isomorphism is interpreted informally as
having the same eect on a selected set of predicates. More precisely, the two
programs are isomorphic relative to a set of observable variables. We will refer
to this property abstraction preservation.
The following denitions formalize the concept of the (Boolean) abstraction
preservation in our setting.
Denition 4.1 [Variable Correspondence] Two expressions, or programs, are
variable-correspondent over a set of variable V , if the variables both expres-
sions (programs) refer to have a one-to-one correspondence with V .
3
For correctness, when a target has multiple annotations, a proxy target location will be
introduced and annotated with a predicate. The proxy target contains a transition that
directly jumps to the real target.
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Intuitively, the concept of variable correspondence allows us to treat the
source program and the compiled program as two versions of the same pro-
gram. Thus we can correspond a state (region) of compiled program to a state
of the source program and correspond a relation between states of compiled
program to a relation between states of the source program by lifting the
variable correspondence over relations between regions and between relations.
Denition 4.2 [Variable Correspondent Relation] For two expressions E
1
and E
2
that are variable-correspondent over V , if relation R holds between
E
1
[V=V
E
1
] and E
2
[V=V
E
2
], where V
E
are the variables appearing in E, we say
the two expressions are related by R with respect to variable correspondence
over V .
Based on this denition, two regions, one dened for the source program
and the other dened for the intermediate language program, can be equivalent
with respect to variable correspondence over the set of observable variables
OV.
Two post operators !
1
and !
2
are equivalent with respect to variable
correspondence over OV if for two input regions that are equivalent with respect
to variable correspondence over OV, they generate two sets of output regions
that are equivalent with respect to the same variable correspondence over OV.
We have the following theorem, which can be proved by induction on the form
of temporal property  involved.
Theorem 4.3 If an LTL formula  over V model checks on the transition
system dened by one post operator !
1
, then it also model checks on a tran-
sition system dened by !
2
that is equivalent to !
1
with respect to variable
correspondence over V .
The concept P -isomorphism below denes the (Boolean) abstraction preser-
vation.
Denition 4.4 [P -Isomorphism] ProgramsA andB that are variable-correspondent
over V are P -isomorphic, for a set of predicates P , if the abstract Boolean
post operators induced by P
A
and P
B
are equivalent with respect to variable
correspondence over V , where P
A
and P
B
are P with variables in V replaced
by the corresponding variables of V in A and B, respectively.
Intuitively, we want to argue, if the compilation comp is generally correct,
then it generates an intermediate program that preserves the abstraction.
Recall that we map every source variable to an intermediate variable. The
general correctness of comp can be dened as that the compiled program and
the source program are Q-isomorphic, where Q is all possible (admissable as
atomic proposition in an LTL formula) predicates over the state variables of
the source program.
If comp is volatile over the observable variables, then the input-output pairs
of the compiled program and those of the source program are variable corre-
10
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spondent over the observable variables. General correctness will require a vari-
able correspondence over all state variables of the source program. Therefore,
the latter correspondence must be a superset of the former correspondence.
From this we directly conclude that the two programs are P -isomorphic.
4.4 Generating Verication Condition
Now that we established the correspondence between intermediate blocks or
locations and Boolean program statements, it will be a client's responsibility
to validate this correspondence. In the line of PCC, this is typically done
through using the semantics of the target language, in this case an intermediate
language, to compute a set of logic formulas known as verication conditions.
A PCC system usually generates these VCs on the server side; a server will
invoke a certifying theorem prover [19] to generate proofs for these VCs. The
VCs will be attached to the mobile program as part of the certicates. A
client will verify the proof to discharge the VCs. In practice, we may choose
to attach the proof or not. In ACCEPT we simply use the Boolean program
as a certicate. For better comparison with related work, we will analyze the
number of VCs needed to prove the correctness of the abstraction, which will
serve as a good measurement of the certicate size.
As mentioned above, the intermediate language code denes a post op-
erator isomorphic to the post operator dened by the source code, both of
which we refer to as post. For a block B annotated by assignments of the
form b
v
:= H(e
1
; e
2
) in the Boolean program, we generate a set of verication
conditions of the form:
(post(c ^ e
1
; B)) e
v
) ^ (post(c ^ e
2
; B)) :e
v
)
where c is 1 if B has no location annotation, or P if the beginning of B is
annotated by assume(P ).
For a block B that is not annotated by Boolean assignments, a test and
jump must follow. Suppose post( ; B
j
) is the post operator for the combined
instructions. Also suppose the annotation at the target location is P . We
generate the following verication condition: post(c; B
j
) ) P , where c is as
dened above.
In the worst case, the total number of VCs is O(mn), where m is the size
of the program, and n is the size of the predicate set.
4.5 Optimization
In a sense, a Boolean statement represents a local invariant of the correspond-
ing source program. Optimization of intermediate code without invalidating
such invariants discovered at the source level has been studied in Necula's
thesis [18]. With some care, we can adopt similar techniques. Below, we
rst describe how we handle register allocation. Then, using a common sub-
expression elimination example, we demonstrate how to optimize the inter-
11
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mediate program without invalidating the invariants. ACCEPT implements
these and a few other optimizations.
Register Allocation: Consider the global variable bound in the bounded
buer example. There are several typical scenarios as far as register allocation
is concerned. One is that a register is dedicated to this variable throughout its
scope. In this case, we only substitute the occurrence of bound in the Boolean
program annotations with that register. If at dierent places a dierent regis-
ter is used, then the variable needs to be loaded into a register, with subsequent
operations on the register and a possible store back to the memory. If this
entire sequence is all in an annotated block, then there is nothing we need to
do, because the observable eect is reected by the value of the variable. If
the sequence crosses a border between blocks, then we modify the predicate
set. Specically, we need to substitute the occurrence of the variable in the
predicate set with the register in all the blocks except the last one, where the
store is issued; this means we have a dierent predicate set entering the last
block. But as long as the variable is not observable, the model checking is
not aected because we still generate the same sequence of transitions. As an
example, when compiling source statements z = x   1; y = x + 1; x = x   1
into three consecutive intermediate blocks, we may load x into the register
r
0
in the rst intermediate block, and later store r
0
back in the third block.
If the predicate set includes fx > 0g, then for the rst two blocks, we shall
observe their eects on fr
0
> 0g instead. In particular, the Boolean state-
ments corresponding to the rst block used to include v
x>0
= v
x>0
, where
v
P
is the Boolean variable representing predicate P . Now the Boolean state-
ment should be v
r
0
>0
= v
x>0
. Similarly, for the last block, the old Boolean
statement v
x>0
= H(0;:v
x>0
) will now be v
x>0
= H(0;:v
r
0
>0
).
Common Subexpression Elimination: Suppose we have the following
sequence:
r
1
:= e; r
2
:= e; :::a sequence
where r
1
is not dened or referenced in the subsequent sequences. We write
r
1
:= e for a sequence that computes e in r
1
. Again, it is only interesting when
r
1
:= e and r
2
:= e are two blocks.
Common sub-expression elimination will get rid of the second computation
of e. Typically, it will replace r
2
:= e with r
2
:= r
1
. But we need the fact
that e is in r
2
to prove the Boolean program annotations associated with the
second block. The trick is to add an assume annotation at the location before
r
2
:= r
1
. In this example, we add assume(r
1
= e). In the verication process,
this assume statement is veried each time the control may reach this program
location.
However, a sequence such as v := e may aect the evaluation of the desired
property. If it does, the optimization will not be performed. Nonetheless, the
correctness of the optimizer, and of the compiler in general, will not aect
the soundness of an ACC system. Wrong compilation will either be caught at
12
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Program Size Cert. Size Percentage Verif. Time
Bounded Buer 702 232 33% 0:42
Vector Addition 808 308 38% 0:30
Reader/Writer 1570 282 18% 0:43
Sleeping Barber 809 200 25% 0:74
Fig. 4. Size of Certicate in Bytes
the client side, or otherwise happen to result in a provably correct program.
ACCEPT uses conservative heuristics to determine if the property will be
aected by an optimization.
5 Experience
We have constructed two instances of the ACCEPT framework. The rst
version, ACCEPT/While, implements a simple compiler for a while language
with concurrency primitives. It generates programs for an index-typed JVM
dialect that we developed earlier. The second version, ACCEPT/C, leverages
the BLAST infrastructure, including CIL. It operates on C language programs.
It also produces index-typed JVM code.
The basic components of ACCEPT include an encoder that encodes Boolean
programs into type annotations is implemented together with the type checker
of SDTAL.
Initial results with ACCEPT/While are reported in Table 4, which lists the
size of the certicate generated for several well studied concurrent programs
and some liveness properties. The percentage indicates that, even when the
program does not contain much irrelevant code (which a realistic program
often does), the size of the certicate is small. Also, we listed the veri-
cation time spent on model checking Promela programs translated from the
abstracted programs. The measurement is done on a Pentium III 700 Hz
laptop with 256MB memory running Linux.
Recently, we migrated BLAST [10] on top of ACCEPT infrastructure,
resulting in ACCEPT/C. We are able to reuse the basic components of AC-
CEPT. BLAST handles the full syntax of C programs through the use of CIL
[15]; BLAST adopts lazy abstraction, a variation of predicate abstraction, to
verify reachability properties of industrial strength programs, such as device
drivers. BLAST represents C programs as labeled transition systems built
from CFAs during model checking. We compute a Boolean program from
BLAST's intermediate result, after BLAST has gone through the renement
based predicate discovery process to settle down with a set of predicates with
which a useful abstraction is made. Then we compile the CFA representation
to JVM code and encode the Boolean program as index type annotations.
13
Xia and Hook
On the client side, ACCEPT's SDTAL type checker will validate the Boolean
program.
The lazy abstraction is a dynamically (in the process of model checking)
scoped predicate abstraction. When we generate Boolean programs, we take
the sum of those predicate sets that are used to abstract the same operation;
the results are statically scoped predicate sets. We use these predicate sets to
abstract the C program.
We are able to generate relatively small certicates. For example, for the
correct use of locks, the certicates generated for most Linux drivers, whose
sizes range from a few hundreds lines to hundreds of thousands lines, range
from hundreds of bytes to a few thousands bytes. The gure is smaller than
the size of certicates generated by BLAST. Note that BLAST only certies
source programs. We compare our result with BLAST here assuming that
BLAST has adopted our compilation scheme and that the proof it generates
is valid for the intermediate program.
Another way to compare with BLAST will count the number of verication
conditions that a certicate induces. With BLAST, the number is the size of
the search tree because a location invariant in BLAST needs regions from
every node in the search tree corresponding to the location. Our certicate is
linear in the size of the relevant part of the program. For correct use of locks,
a search tree often collapses into a chain because of the typical way a lock is
used. For such applications, BLAST is able to generate very small certicates.
For more complicated properties, such as the IRP specication of Windows
NT drivers, a typical proof generated by SLAM can be about 100 Mega bytes,
which can be compressed to about a few Mega bytes. A typical ACCEPT/C
certicate is about 100 Kilo bytes before compression.
The price we pay is the time spent on model checking. While BLAST
veries a proof of the size of the search tree, we need to generate the search
tree. This means calling a decision procedure as many times as the size of the
search tree in the worst case. In practice, such search doesn't take long[10],
ranging from less than a second to a few seconds for checking the correct use
of locks for Linux device drivers. In Table 5, we list the results of certifying a
few Linux device drivers using our system. The verication time is the model
checking time reported by BLAST. The numbers can be improved if a quicker
model checker is adopted. The program size is the number of lines of code
after we pre-process the source program. Certicate size is measured in bytes.
Our experience conrmed that the verication time is acceptable for some
applications.
Correct usage of locks is a relatively simple property. We have tested our
toolset over some NT drivers for the compliance of a much more complicated
API. The results are encouraging too. For example, cdaudio.c, which is a big
program of more than 400 KB, is abstracted into a Boolean program of 55 KB,
while the uncompressed BLAST certicate is more than 200 MB. We estimate
a upperbound of model checking this Boolean program as taking 52 s.
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Program Size Cert. Size BLAST Cert. Size Verif. Time
atp.c 2482 1212 8737 1:31sec
ide.c 48k 876 12452 0:37sec
audio.c 175k 15410 502575 5:60sec
cdaudio.c 456K 55K 233M 52sec
oppy.c 440K 51K 33M 33sec
Fig. 5. Comparison between ACCEPT/C and BLAST
To summarize, using ACCEPT/C, we obtain a practical solution to the
certication of reachability properties on realistic C programs. This solution
trades model checking time for certicate size.
6 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that a Boolean program can be generated for an in-
termediate program through abstraction preserving compilation. This Boolean
program can be used as a certicate for a temporal property on the interme-
diate code. Such treatment trades verication time for certicate size. In
practice, the trade-o represents a viable solution to the certication of tem-
poral properties. This claim is justied by our extension to BLAST.
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